Archived News
Commercial Law
- Acceptance of Repair Means Acceptance of Goods
- Doing Your Best Isn’t Reasonable
- Expired Disciplinary Warnings
- Inducement to Break Contract Must be Deliberate
- Is the JCT Valid?
- Landlocked Land – Lords Confirm No Right of Access
- Leases – New Code of Practice
- Acceptance of payment causes loss of rights
- Assessment of damages based on rental value
- Careful drafting pays dividends
- Landlords must act fairly
- Planning consent time strictly enforced
- Restraint of trade clauses
- Shareholder dispute costs
- Too lenient sentence for Director
- Understand the contract before you sign
- Property Options Agreements
- TUPE Regulations 2006
- Law Not to be Used to Prevent Landlord's Exit Strategy
- Director's Guarantee Not Unfair
- Directors – Danger in Funding Litigation
- Business Property Relief – More Traps for the Unwary
Personal Law
- Case Sounds Foreign Will Warning
- Cohabiting Couples - Case Shows Wisdom of Formal Agreements
- Compensation Ordered for Duped ‘Dad’
- Consumer Law Gives Protection in Standard Form Contracts
- Government Proposes Changes to Law on Damages
- Holiday Club Warning
- Husband Loses Big Money Decision
- Oral Agreement Gives Rise to Property Rights
- Proposals to Protect Cohabitees
- Valuing Annuity Payments for IHT
- Care Assessment Must Consider Child’s Interests
- Cases Show Court Hostility to Poor Behaviour
- Check Your Will
- Child Contact – Changes Afoot
- Noisy Pubs – What Can be Done?
- Option Agreement Binding on Landlord Despite Rent Arrears
- Poorer Spouse Must Have Proper Representation
- Right to Buy – The Present Position
- Trustee Exemption Clauses – New Approach
- Violent Fathers – Is the Court of Appeal Too Soft?
- Budget Inheritance Tax Grab - April 2006
- Short-marriage Widow Sees Financial Provision Cut
- Prescott Aims to End ‘Satellite Dish Blight’
- Lasting Powers of Attorney – Government Reveals Plans
- Landlords to Lose Right to Retain Deposits
- Chancellor Declares War on Trusts
- How Divorce Works
Acceptance of Repair Means Acceptance of Goods
The sale of goods by traders is covered by the Sale of Goods Act 1979, which requires that the goods sold must be as described, of satisfactory quality and fit for purpose. If these criteria are not met, the buyer has the right to reject them. However, the trader might offer to replace or repair the goods.
Recently, the House of Lords heard an appeal, from the Scottish Court of Session, which required it to consider the position in which a trader delivered defective goods to the customer, who then agreed that they should be repaired. The question that arose was whether the customer could then reject the repaired goods.
J & H Ritchie Ltd. had purchased a combination seed drill and harrow from Lloyd Ltd. When it was made ready for use by Ritchie, it was immediately obvious that the harrow was not working properly as it had excessive vibration. Ritchie stopped using the harrow and contacted Lloyd, which agreed to repair it. Having collected the machine and diagnosed the problem – two missing bearings – Lloyd ordered the parts and, when these arrived, it repaired the machine and informed Ritchie that it was ready for collection. This process took some weeks. Lloyd did not tell Ritchie the nature of the problem when requested to do so, merely replying that the equipment was repaired and that the repair had made the equipment as good as new.
Unhappy with this response, Ritchie rejected the machine. Lloyd commenced legal proceedings, arguing that Ritchie was bound by law to accept the repaired goods.
Although Lord Brown was critical of Lloyd for its lack of candidness regarding the nature of the problem, in the view of the Lords, where a buyer receives goods which are defective and the defect is clear to buyer and seller, there is an implied duty on the part of the buyer to accept the goods and pay for them once the necessary repairs have been carried out. In the words of Lord Hope, “A buyer who…allows the seller to incur the expense of repair is under an implied obligation to accept and pay for the goods once the repair has been carried out.”
This judgment has clear implications for purchasers of goods who find them to be defective. If they agree to have the goods repaired, the right to reject them will normally be lost.
Contact John Lennon for advice on any contractual matter.
Doing Your Best Isn’t Reasonable
A recent decision of the commercial court confirms that doing your best isn’t reasonable – or, more correctly, that to make reasonable endeavours to do something is not the same as making your best endeavours to do it.
The case concerned a contractual dispute between two companies, one of which was buying a business from the other. The dispute involved the interpretation of the phrase ‘reasonable endeavours’ in relation to a contract, with a third company, which was to be transferred between the two companies following the sale.
The contract was not transferred and the vendor company brought a suit alleging that the purchaser had not met its obligations because it had not used reasonable steps to ensure the contract was transferred.
The court, however, considered that ‘reasonable endeavours’ did not mean that all reasonable courses of action had to be taken. If that were the case, there would be no difference between ‘reasonable endeavours’ and ‘best endeavours’, a term also used in legal agreements in some circumstances. In the court’s view, a ‘reasonable endeavours’ clause must be less stringent than a ‘best endeavours’ clause and such a term will normally be satisfied if a reasonable course is taken. The exception would be if the clause sets out specifically what steps should be taken, in which case compliance will only be achieved if all the specified steps are carried out.
Says Sue Jones, “If something is very important, the phrase to use is ‘best endeavours’, which will require a higher standard of effort on the part of the other party to the contract to ensure that the desired end is achieved.”
We can assist you in negotiating all commercial agreements.
Expired Disciplinary Warnings
A further case has illustrated that employers cannot place reliance on a disciplinary warning that has expired, either in disciplinary proceedings or to justify dismissal.
In Airbus UK Ltd. v Webb, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) has ruled that a Tribunal is ‘obliged, and not merely entitled, to ignore expired warnings’.
Mr Webb worked for Airbus as an aircraft fitter. In July 2004 he was dismissed for gross misconduct after he was found washing his car when he should have been working. He appealed against the decision to dismiss him and the disciplinary action was reduced to the lesser sanction of a final written warning which would remain on his record for 12 months.
Three weeks after the written warning expired, Mr Webb and four other employees were caught in the locker area, watching television, outside their normal break time. All five were found guilty of gross misconduct. Mr Webb was dismissed but the other four employees received final warnings because they had no prior disciplinary record.
Mr Webb claimed that he had been unfairly dismissed. The Employment Tribunal (ET) took into account the decision of the Scottish Court of Session in Diosynth Ltd. v Thomson in which the Court had ruled that the employee was entitled to assume that a similar warning meant what it said and that it would cease to have any effect after one year. The ET held that as Mr Webb would not have been dismissed had he not been given a previous warning, it followed that his dismissal was unfair.
Airbus appealed against the ET’s decision and lost. However, the EAT confessed to having some difficulty in deciding whether or not the ET is obliged to ignore past warnings that have expired, but judged on balance that it is. The EAT went on to suggest that although the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures suggests that final warnings should normally expire after 12 months, this need not always be the case. A longer time limit might be appropriate if the nature of the misconduct justifies it.
It is important to ensure that the time limits for disciplinary warnings fit the particular circumstances and that your policies and procedures allow you to issue an extended warning where this is deemed necessary. Contact Sue Jones for advice.
Inducement to Break Contract Must be Deliberate
Where one person induces another to breach a contract, the other party to that contract may have the right to claim for damages against both the person who has committed the breach of the contract and the person who induced them to do so.
A company called Mainstream recently successfully sued two of its employees for breach of contract after they set up their own joint venture, with a Mr De Winter, and diverted development business away from their employer to the new business. Mr De Winter had supplied the finance for the new business. Mainstream then set about suing Mr De Winter for inducing its employees to breach their contracts with Mainstream.
There was no doubt that the breach of contract could not have occurred had Mr De Winter not supplied the necessary funding. However, the House of Lords found that Mr De Winter was not to blame. Recognising the potential for a conflict of interest between the employees and Mainstream, he had sought and received assurances from the employees that there was no conflict. They had maintained that there was no conflict because Mainstream had been offered the development site but had refused it. That was not the case, but Mr De Winter was unaware of that. It was also relevant that he had supported a similar development by the employees a year earlier to which Mainstream had no objection.
This case is important since it demonstrates that a claim for damages for inducing a breach of contract will only be successful where the breach is deliberate. To prove a case of breach of contract, it is necessary that there is a breach of contract, that the person procuring the breach knows they are procuring it and that the breach is an end in itself or is a means to an end.
In practice, this decision may well make the defence of ‘ignorance of the consequences’ easier to sustain in similar cases.
Is the JCT Valid?
The House of Lords recently had to consider whether the contractual terms in the JCT standard building contract (1998) are compliant with the provisions of the Construction Act. It was the first case of its kind.
A company called Melville Dundas Ltd. was acting as a contractor to construction giant Wimpey and issued demands for stage payments in the normal way. After making one such demand (in relation to which Wimpey did not make a withholding notice), Melville Dundas became insolvent and Wimpey terminated the contract and did not make the payment.
The relevant section of the JCT standard form agreement allows a developer to terminate a contract with a contractor in the event of the contractor’s insolvency and to withhold payments. In effect, it limits the developer’s liability to the contractor to the value of work done and is designed to protect the position of the developer should there be additional costs, with regard to the completion of the work, which would otherwise have to be claimed against the insolvent contractor.
Melville Dundas argued that the relevant section of the JCT agreement was invalid under the Construction Act because it took away its right to receive the payment even though Wimpey had not issued a valid withholding notice.
The Lords, in a 3-2 split decision, agreed with Wimpey’s contention that the payment was validly withheld.
If you are having difficulties with payments in a construction contract, contact us for advice.
Landlocked Land – Lords Confirm No Right of Access
The House of Lords has confirmed the 2006 decision of the Court of Appeal that when a piece of land is landlocked (i.e. has no right of access over adjoining land so cannot be lawfully accessed by its owner), there is no automatic right to have a right of way ‘of necessity’ over adjoining land.
The case involved land which was bounded to the East and to the West by private land. To the North and South it was bounded by a piece of land and a highway respectively. Both of the latter pieces of land had been sold to the predecessor of the local authority which now owned them. The landlocked land had been retained by the original owner and the conveyance of the adjoining land which was sold did not reserve any right of access over it.
When the landlocked land was subsequently sold, the company that bought it sought to obtain a ruling that it should be granted a right of way to its property over the land to the North, which would be necessary for the land to be developed. The local authority had previously indicated that planning permission for access to the highway would not be granted.
In the view of the Court of Appeal, at the time the land was sold there had been no common intention that there should be a right of access across the land to the North. Accordingly a right of way of necessity should not be granted. The Lords confirmed this decision.
“This case illustrates the importance of not making assumptions – especially over things as critical as access to land,” says John Lennon. “You should always make sure that the essentials are in place before signing on the dotted line. Relying on the courts to put things right after the event is a very risky strategy.”
Leases – New Code of Practice
A new code of practice for commercial leases has been issued following a long consultation exercise involving landlords and other interested parties.
The code makes a number of changes to the substance and detail of current practice.
These include:
- a simplified approach to the exercising of break clauses by tenants;
- sub-letting of the whole premises to be normally completed without the requirement for financial guarantees by the existing tenant;
- a more flexible approach to rent reviews, rather than just ‘upward only’ reviews;
- the requirement for landlords to provide best estimates of service charges; and
- the requirement that tenants’ repairing obligations should be appropriate considering the terms of the lease.
The Code for Leasing Business Premises in England and Wales 2007 can be found at:
http://www.leasingbusinesspremises.co.uk/downloads/lbp_booklet.pdf.
Acceptance of payment causes loss of rights
A recent case involving a tenant that became insolvent should sound a warning bell for landlords. In this instance the tenant, which was a company, entered into a company voluntary arrangement (CVA) and the landlord accepted payments of rent after the due dates.
The relevant lease contained a clause which allowed the landlord to repossess the property if the tenant became insolvent or fell into arrears of rent. The landlord, therefore, applied for forfeiture of the lease. He failed in the Court of Appeal, which ruled that because the landlord had accepted the late payments of rent, he had waived his right to forfeiture of the lease and that the tenant’s debts for arrears of rent were compromised under the CVA.
“If your tenant falls into arrears of rent and/or service charges, take advice before you take action or even accept a late payment from the tenant,” says Mike Stone. “Hasty actions can have expensive unforeseen consequences.”
Assessment of Damages Based on Rental Value
The Court of Appeal recently heard a case in which the question at issue was the correct basis for calculating the damages payable by a landlord to the tenant of a flat for the landlord’s breach of the repairing covenant under the lease. The tenant occupied the flat as his home under a 99-year lease, paying only ground rent.
In this instance, the landlord had failed to keep the roof of the property in good repair, which resulted in water coming into the flat in substantial quantities. The tenant put up with this for nearly three years but was eventually compelled to vacate the flat for a period of 21 months.
The tenant sued the landlord. The judge awarded the tenant £20,000 by way of damages for his period of occupation and £10,000 for the period when he was forced to move out. The landlord appealed, arguing that the damages suffered were only in the region of £3,300 and that it was unfair for damages to be on a ‘loss of rental value’ basis, assessed on the deemed market rent, when the tenant was paying only a ground rent.
The Court of Appeal concluded that whilst there was no general ‘tariff’ which applied in such cases, the resulting assessment of damages payable to the tenant by the landlord should be made with reference to the reduction in the open-market rental value of the flat and the impact on that of the unrectified roof problem. The fact that the tenant was paying only ground rent was not in point.
The message for landlords is that failing to comply with repairing covenants in leases with tenants can cost more than just the cost of repair, even where the tenant is on a long-term lease paying only a ground rent.
Careful Drafting Pays Dividends
A landlord who failed to include an appropriate clause for subletting to a social tenant in his lease with a local authority recently had cause to regret the way in which the lease had been drafted. The case involved a flat which was intended to be let for temporary housing and which was eventually let to a sub-tenant of the local authority for several years. The lease, given to Haringey District Council, omitted a clause which prevented the tenant from acquiring full security of tenure. In order to prevent a tenant acquiring security of tenure, the head lease must contain a provision entitling the lessor to take possession of the premises on the expiry of a stated period or when required by the lessor, so as to comply with the Housing Act 1985.
When the sub-tenant fell into arrears, the Council sought repossession of the property. During the course of those proceedings, it was decided that she had acquired a secure tenancy because the clause in the Housing Act dealing with such leases specifies that a lease does not create a secure tenancy when the terms on which the property has been leased ‘include provision for the lessor to obtain vacant possession … on the expiry of a specified period or when required by the lessor’. The Court of Appeal decided this had to be construed strictly, meaning that the head lease must contain a break clause worded loosely enough to allow the landlord to obtain vacant possession either on the expiry of the lease or when required by him. In this case, the lessor could only require that the property was vacated at the end of the lease and the tenancy therefore qualified as a secure tenancy.
The landlord was therefore left with a sitting tenant – a most unfortunate result given that the property was only intended to be used for temporary housing.
Says Mike Stone, “This case raises serious issues for landlords wishing to let properties to social housing providers. Contact us for advice.”
Landlords Must Act Fairly and in Reasonable Time
A recent case involving the recovery of service charges has seen the court criticise the way that landlords and their agents often deal with service charges.
The case involved a property in Piccadilly, London, which is tenanted. The basement-level tenant is a casino (Distinctive Clubs Ltd.) and it entered into its lease in 1998. The building was known to have structural problems with its roof, which needed substantial repair, and the lease signed by Distinctive Clubs contained a clause which limited its liability for repair works during the first five years of its lease. The estimated cost of repair in 2002 was £200,000.
In 2004 (after the limitation clause had expired), the landlord carried out roof repairs, which included building a new structure which benefited only the tenant occupying the top floor. The total bill amounted to over £2m and Distinctive Clubs’ contribution to the repairs was assessed at £700,000. In court there were two main questions to address.
Firstly, was the basement tenant liable to pay for the works that benefited only the top floor tenant and which, in any event, were improvements to the property, rather than repairs?
Secondly, was the delay in carrying out the repairs reasonable?
In the view of the court, the repairs to the roof were justifiable repairs under the lease. However, the improvements which benefited only the rooftop tenant were not, so Distinctive Clubs would not be liable to contribute to those. However, in the view of the court, the landlord could, had it shown reasonable alacrity, have completed the repairs by 2003. Accordingly, Distinctive Clubs was not liable to contribute to any of the cost of the repairs.
The judge criticised the landlord and its agents for including in the landlord’s claim sums which were not properly due and for not informing the tenants of the spiralling cost of the roof repairs. He also criticised the agents for their lack of independence, characterising their approach as seemingly being intent only on recovering as much as possible of the cost from the tenants.
The lesson for landlords and their agents is that attempts to collect ‘full recovery service charges’ in a way which does not properly balance the interests of tenants and landlords is likely to get short shrift in the courts.
If you have problems with any aspect of a lease, contact Mike Stone for advice.
Planning Consent Time Bar Strictly Enforced
The Court of Appeal has confirmed that where there is a breach of planning consent through failure to comply with the use specified in the consent, where this relates to use as a single dwelling, the right to enforce the terms of the consent must be exercised within four years of the breach.
The case concerned Arun District Council, which had granted permission for an extension to a property on the condition that it was occupied by the dependent relative of the occupier. The extension was later let to students, in breach of the planning consent, and the property was effectively occupied as two dwellings. Eight years later, the Council sought an enforcement order against the homeowner. The Council argued that it could bring the action because there is a statutory ten-year period for the bringing of such actions where there is ‘any other breach of planning control’. However, the section of the Town and Country Planning Act which deals specifically with breaches relating to buildings to be used as a single dwelling specifies a four-year period, from completion of the works, during which any enforcement action must be brought.
The case turned on the fact that there is a specific section in the Act which relates to such breaches, so it was clear that the intention of Parliament was to apply one time limit in such cases and another time limit for other breaches.
Contact Mike Stone for advice on any commercial property or planning matter.
Restraint of Trade Clauses – Care Needed
In a society that promotes freedom of trade, it is no wonder that the law as regards restraint of trade agreements provides only limited protection. Such agreements are relatively common within agency agreements. Coming into effect when the agency ends, they are normally used to prevent the agent from soliciting former customers for a period of time.
The courts will only enforce such an agreement to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to do so to protect a legitimate business interest. To be enforceable, the agreement must be reasonable both in terms of time and geographic coverage.
In a recent case the agency agreement specified that after its termination the agent was not allowed, for a period of two years, to solicit ‘any person, firm or company’ who had been a customer of the principal within the year prior to termination of the agency agreement. This group included customers who had had no dealings with the agent.
Although the two-year restriction was not thought to be objectionable by the court, it found the clause to be too broad to be enforceable, especially as there would be customers who had dealt directly with the principal who the agent would not know were customers.
“The message for businesses seeking to rely on such clauses is to take care that the wording is not too broad, or the court will render the agreement unenforceable,” says Sue Jones. “We can assist in the negotiation and implementation of all types of commercial agreement.”
Shareholder Dispute Costs Minority Shareholder
A recent case before the High Court illustrates the wisdom of having a shareholders’ agreement in place in small companies. In the case in question, the majority shareholder had paid himself levels of remuneration which meant that the dividends paid to the minority shareholder were less than she felt she should have received. This resulted in a breakdown of trust and confidence between the shareholders such that the only appropriate resolution of the situation was for the majority shareholder to purchase the shareholding of the minority shareholder.
The minority shareholder applied to the Court for a ruling that her shareholding should be valued pro-rata to the value of the company as a whole, contending that there was a quasi-partnership. Normally, valuations of minority shareholdings are discounted because the rights of minority shareholders are restricted. So, for example, a 49 per cent shareholding might be valued at 30 per cent of the total value of the company. However, where a quasi-partnership exists, the minority shareholder would normally receive the undiscounted value of his or her proportionate shareholding in the company.
A quasi-partnership exists where the relationship between the shareholders is personal and based on trust, where the shareholders are all involved in the management of the business and where they provide more input to it than merely advancing capital.
However, in this case the Court found that the necessary elements for a quasi-partnership did not exist and the minority interest should not be valued pro-rata.
One of the key points in this case was that had there been a shareholders’ agreement in force that covered the calculation of the price payable on the disposal of shares by one shareholder to the other, the litigation could have been avoided. If your company does not have a shareholders’ agreement or your partnership does not have a partnership agreement, contact Sue Jones for advice.
Too Lenient Sentence for Director Successfully Appealed
A recent case illustrates the dangers for directors who adopt a cavalier attitude to the safety of their employees.
Michael Shaw was a director of a company which made kitchen work surfaces and bathroom fittings. A stone-cutting machine used by the company had been examined by an inspector from the Health and Safety Executive and was found to have three safety devices disabled. They had, apparently, been disabled when the machine was installed. Mr Shaw was informed of this and was ordered to have the devices reinstated immediately. This he failed to do. It was later argued in Mr Shaw’s defence that leaving the devices disabled was commonplace as it allowed much more economical use of the machine because they regularly caused interruptions to production.
The company of which Mr Shaw was a director also provided minimal safety training for its employees.
Tragically, an employee was killed whilst using the stone-cutting machine. Mr Shaw pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the basis of gross negligence. The judge, mindful of his guilty plea and the effect on the business of imposing a custodial sentence on him, gave Mr Shaw a suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment.
The Attorney General appealed against the sentence, arguing that it failed to provide a sufficient deterrent or properly to reflect the severity of the offence.
The Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal accepted the Attorney General’s argument. The fact that the safety devices were commonly disabled was no defence and the sentence was too lenient. Mr Shaw was given a custodial sentence of fifteen months.
Ignoring health and safety responsibilities is likely to lead to a heavy penalty in cases such as this. If your health and safety procedures are lax, we advise that you review them immediately and introduce measures to train and protect your workers.
Understand the Contract Before You Sign!
A recent case involving a contractual dispute between a franchisor and franchisee (a fairly common situation) highlights the need both to consider contractual terms carefully and to take advice before acting when a dispute arises.
The nub of the issue was that the franchisor was considered by the franchisee to be trying to impose unreasonable terms. The franchisor ran a business (eTyres) which took orders over the Internet for tyre fitting which it then referred to its franchisees, making a deduction from the payments received for so doing. The franchisee was a tyre fitter who had a substantial business outside the eTyres fitting business.
The franchisor sought to require the franchisee to change the livery of its vehicles and, in effect, to make eTyres the franchisee’s trading style, which the franchisee felt would have been to the detriment of its business generally.
The franchisee alleged that the franchisor had made deductions from the sales receipts which were greater than was allowed under the franchise agreement.
Because of these factors, the franchisee determined to set up in competition with eTyres. When the franchisor found out about this, it terminated the franchise agreement and sought an injunction against the franchisee.
The questions before the court were whether the franchisor had made excessive deductions (which involved more than one issue) and whether the franchise agreement would allow the franchisor to require the franchisee to change its trading style.
The court took the view that the basis of calculation adopted by the franchisor was justifiable, but making deductions in excess of the percentage stated in the franchise agreement was not. The franchisor could not compel the franchisee to change its trading style for its whole business. The actions of the franchisor amounted to a repudiation of the original agreement and the franchisee was therefore entitled to have the injunction discharged and to have its counterclaim allowed.
Says Sue Jones, “This is a case which clearly arose because each party had different ideas about what the franchise agreement meant and these were not resolved. Franchise agreements are often the cause of difficulty and it makes sense to ensure that legal advice is taken and any areas of possible disagreement are ironed out before you commit yourself.”
Property Options Agreements
People who want to buy a property but do not currently have the means to do so, or who simply want to be guaranteed the opportunity to buy it during a specified period or at some future date, will often undertake an option agreement with the owner. Under such an agreement, the prospective purchaser enters into a contract, which normally involves the payment of an up-front charge in exchange for having the legal right to buy the property at or within some future time. Options are widely used where a purchaser wishes to purchase land only if an event (normally the granting of planning permission which the prospective purchaser undertakes to obtain) occurs.
The timing of a purchase under an option agreement can be influenced by a number of factors, so options are usually for a specified period. One common trap in these cases is that the maximum period for which such an option can legally be granted is 21 years. If the option is created for a longer (or indeterminate) period, it is unenforceable. This is so even if the option must be preceded by some event, such as the granting of planning permission. Also, an option for sale of land may have to be registered at the Land Registry to be enforceable. In order to purchase the land subject to the option, the purchaser must serve on the vendor a valid notice within the specified time limit. If the option is to be exercised just before the period expires, it is advisable to ensure that proof of delivery (time and/or date stamped as appropriate) is obtained. Also, the option notice must not in any way change the subject of the notice. For example, adding an offer to purchase something attached to the land which was not mentioned in the original option agreement will probably invalidate the option.
It is especially important to make sure all procedural matters are dealt with correctly as regards the notice to exercise the option. In particular, it is sensible for the purchaser of an option to make sure that where there is a ‘trigger event’, which starts the time running during which the option can be exercised, the wording of the agreement is such that the clock starts running when the purchaser becomes aware of the event, not when the event takes place. Failure to do this could result in the loss of ability to exercise an option because the prospective purchaser is unaware of the occurrence of the trigger event.
Please contact Mike Stone for advice on commercial property matters.
TUPE Regulations 2006
On 6 April, the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (TUPE) come into force. These apply to any size of business and protect the employment rights of employees when their employer changes as a result of the relevant transfer of a business or a part of one. They implement the EC Acquired Rights Directive. The main changes are:
- a widening of the scope of the Regulations to cover situations where services are contracted out, contracted in or where a contract is assigned to a new contractor on subsequent re-tendering. These are described as ‘service provision changes’. The Regulations will not apply, however, where the service provision is a single specific event or task of short-term duration;
- a new duty on the transferor to supply specific information about the transferring employees to the new employer by providing what is termed ‘employee liability information’. This must be given at least two weeks before the completion of the transfer unless this is not reasonably practicable. The transferee will be able to claim for compensation in the Employment Tribunal if the transferor fails to provide the required information and will be entitled to not less than £500 from the transferor for each employee for whom information was not provided;
- • special provisions making it easier for insolvent businesses to be transferred to new employers – for example, allowing the parties in such situations to agree to vary contracts of employment in an attempt to assist the economic recovery of the business;
- provisions which clarify the ability of employers and employees to agree to vary contracts of employment if, for example, the reason for doing so is an ‘economic, technical or organisational reason’ entailing changes in the workforce; and
- provisions which clarify the circumstances under which it is unfair for employers to dismiss employees for reasons connected with a relevant transfer.
The Regulations place a duty on both the transferor and the transferee employers to inform and consult representatives of their employees who may be affected by the transfer with a view to seeking their agreement to the measures. There will be joint and several liability on the transferor and transferee for a failure to inform and consult, thus ensuring that each has a clear incentive to comply with the requirement.
The Department of Trade and Industry had considered excluding professional business services from the scope of the new TUPE Regulations but no such exemption has been included.
The new Regulations apply to transfers that take place on or after 6 April 2006 with the new employee liability information applying to relevant transfers that take place on or after 20 April. Guidance on the Regulations. Says Sue Jones, “Failure to comply with the TUPE provisions can be very expensive for businesses, and it is important to take advice at the beginning of the process.”
Law Not to be Used to Prevent Landlord’s Exit Strategy
The House of Lords has confirmed that the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 is not intended to be used to prevent a landlord from exercising an exit strategy as regards a lease.
A company called Avonridge was the head tenant of a number of shops under a lease due to expire in 2067. It granted subleases, to six tenants, which included a covenant by Avonridge to pay the rent due under the head lease, but only until such time as it had disposed of its interest in the property.
Once the subleases had been granted, Avonridge sold the head lease on to another company, thus ending its interest in the property. The new owner subsequently disappeared, leaving the rent under the head lease unpaid.
The tenants were then faced with a bill for the rent unpaid under the head lease and sued Avonridge, claiming that the relevant clause was prohibited under the 1995 Act. The Act contains provisions which will allow the owner of a head lease to accomplish what Avonridge sought to do, but only by the service of specific notices, which did not occur in this case. It also contains anti-avoidance provisions to make void any wording in a tenancy agreement which would frustrate any other section of the Act.
The House of Lords decided that the purpose of the Act is to give both landlords and tenants an exit strategy from their lease commitments when they enter into legal assignments of their interests. It can not be used to prevent a landlord having an exit strategy which has been agreed with a tenant. The failure to follow the procedure as set out in the Act did not, in this case, invalidate the agreed terms.
Tenants with sub-tenants should consider making sure their under leases do contain clauses limiting their liability by the provision of automatic releases from their obligations if they dispose of their interest in a property. If such clauses are not present, they should follow the notice procedure laid down in the Act.
Please contact Mike Stone for advice on commercial property matters.
Director’s Guarantee Not Unfair
An entrepreneur who challenged the Royal Bank of Scotland’s (RBS) attempt to enforce the director’s guarantee he had given was unsuccessful in persuading the court that the guarantee contained unfair contract terms.
Mr Singh’s company provided small businesses with secretarial and administrative assistance. It had incurred an overdraft of £900,000 with the bank when the company failed.
Mr Singh argued that RBS could not enforce the guarantee since he believed that he had a partnership with the bank. He considered there was an agreement whereby RBS was going to market his company’s services and that his company was induced to borrow the funds on the understanding that such a partnership existed. He argued that when the bank failed to market his business services it was in breach of the partnership agreement and caused the failure of his company. He also argued that he would not have agreed to give a director’s guarantee had the bank not agreed to market his company’s services.
This first line of argument failed to impress the court as there was no evidence of a partnership agreement since nothing was done or said which could have been interpreted as an offer of a partnership or joint venture. Furthermore, it was not reasonable for Mr Singh to believe that the bank official with whom he was dealing could commit RBS to such an agreement.
Mr Singh then sought to have the bank’s guarantee arrangement ruled unfair because it had a ‘no set-off’ clause, which he felt was unreasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA). Such clauses are standard in guarantees and act to prevent a bank’s right to recovery under the guarantee being frustrated by claims against it. In other words, whatever Mr Singh’s claims against RBS might be, he had to repay the amount he had guaranteed and pursue his claims separately.
The judge could not agree with Mr Singh. The UCTA regulates contracts between sellers and consumers and is designed to protect consumers in circumstances in which there is a large preponderance of power in the hands of the seller. In this instance, RBS was selling a service to the company. Mr Singh would only have a liability under the guarantee if his company failed to repay its borrowings. The UCTA was not applicable in such circumstances. However, the court also considered what the position would be if UCTA did apply and concluded that even if it did, the ‘no set-off’ clause could not be unfair – it was not unfair for RBS to protect itself by taking additional security.
Says Sue Jones, “The serious implication of this case for directors is that if asked to sign a guarantee for the borrowing of the company, a director is unlikely to get any protection from the courts if the guarantee is one-sided. We can assist you in negotiating commercial finance of all types and advise on the wording of agreements.”
Directors – Danger in Funding Litigation
It is not uncommon for a smaller company that wishes to undertake litigation to lack sufficient funds to do so. When this occurs, a director or directors will sometimes put the company in funds to pay the legal bills.
In such circumstances, it has been usual for directors to be protected from having to pay the other side’s costs (by a ‘non-party costs order’) if the company loses its case, unless they have acted improperly or in bad faith. The courts in such instances have traditionally looked to see if the action is bona fide and whether the actions of the directors were otherwise so exceptional as to justify making a costs order against them.
More recently, however, judicial opinion has changed. Now, the prevailing view is that if a director funds a company’s costs in an unsuccessful action, he should pay the successful party’s costs if:
- he substantially controls the proceedings or will benefit from the action; or
- he funds proceedings by an insolvent company either solely or substantially for his own benefit.
The decision by the court as to whether it will look to the director who has funded corporate litigation to pay the costs will depend on who is the ‘real’ litigant. If the director funding the action is in essence controlling it and it is carried out essentially for his own benefit, then he can be held liable for the other side’s costs if the case is lost.
It is no longer necessary for there to be impropriety in order for a director who funds litigation on behalf of a company to be caught for the costs of a lost case.
It is essential to take care when considering litigation, especially if you are funding all or part of the costs from your own pocket. Our litigation specialist, John Lennon, can advise you on all corporate and litigation matters.
Business Property Relief – More Traps for the Unwary
Most business people know that for family businesses there are generous Inheritance Tax (IHT) reliefs, which generally operate to make assets used in the business exempt or partially exempt from IHT. The reliefs take various forms, but are collectively known as business property relief (BPR).
Consider, however, the common situation whereby a business is owned by a small number of people and, in order to preserve the business in the event of the death of a shareholder before retirement, an agreement is made whereby on death the deceased’s personal representatives are required to sell their shareholding to the remaining shareholders, who are required to buy it. Such arrangements are normally funded by writing life assurance policies to cover the purchase.
Regrettably, such an arrangement will prevent the operation of BPR. This is because HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) regard such an arrangement as a binding contract for sale on death and where such a binding contract exists, BPR is not given. This problem can be avoided by granting each side the appropriate option, rather than making the requirement to buy the shares contractual.
BPR is also not given on family company shares if the company is wholly or mainly engaged in dealing in shares or securities, dealing in land or buildings or making or holding investments. The normal practice of HMRC is to define ‘mainly’ as being ‘more than fifty per cent’. The fifty per cent test is applied to all of: • the capital employed;
- employee time spent on each activity;
- turnover;
- profits; and
- the overall context of the business.
In other words, a ‘whole business’ view has to be taken. Needless to say, this has led to much dispute over the years.
Lastly, a business which is too ‘cash rich’ can also face a denial of BPR insofar as it applies to the cash on the balance sheet at the date of death if this is in excess of the amount required for the purposes of the company’s business. Cash in excess of that required for the company’s future business is ‘excepted’ from eligibility for BPR. In a fairly recent case, a company which had £450,000 in its balance sheet, but which was reckoned by the tax inspector to need only £150,000, faced an IHT charge on the ‘excess’ of £300,000. One way which this type of charge may be avoided is to hold board meetings and minute the need for cash balances to be held on the balance sheet in order to finance future (stated) investment and/or trading needs.
“BPR is laden with traps for the unwary,” says Michael Cutler. “If your estate includes shares in a business, take advice to make sure you maximise your tax relief. Simply assuming that BPR will apply is a dangerous strategy.”
Case Sounds Foreign Will Warning
A man who died in Barbados leaving a will there as well as a will made in the UK created a problem for his family. The will made in Barbados was drawn up after his English will and contained the usual clause ‘revoking all former wills and testamentary dispositions’. The will contained details of various bequests and dealt with the man’s property in Barbados, but it made no mention of any arrangements for his interment or his UK assets.
The court accepted that the later will was an additional will, intended only to deal with the man’s assets in Barbados, and therefore his English will was the basis under which his other assets should be distributed.
The important issue here for people with assets (such as a holiday home) abroad is that whilst it is normally very sensible to create a ‘local will’, this should specify the assets it covers. In the worst case, an inappropriately drafted will may revoke an earlier English will, but at the very least, as in this case, it may add time and expense to the administration of the estate.
Contact Michael Cutler for advice on estate planning, wills or any related matter.
Cohabiting Couples – Case Shows Wisdom of Formal Agreements
Setting down on paper their intentions regarding the ownership of assets is not likely to be one of the first things two people think about when they start living together, but a recent case shows the wisdom in such circumstances of making sure that at least some aspects of your arrangements are properly agreed and evidenced.
The case, which reached the House of Lords, concerned the division of the value of a house. The property had been bought by Barry Stack and Dehra Dowden and was in their joint names. They lived together for almost thirty years and had four children, but they eventually parted.
When the house was purchased, Mr Stack paid both the endowment premiums required to repay the mortgage and the mortgage interest. There were two policies, one in his name and one in their joint names. The house cost £190,000, of which Ms Dowden had contributed nearly £129,000 from her savings and the sale of her own house. The couple had lived together in that property for ten years, but it had been owned in Ms Dowden’s name only. During the time they lived in the house they owned jointly, Mr Stack paid £27,000 and Ms Dowden paid £38,435 in capital repayments. The arrangements of the couple were unusual in that their financial affairs were kept completely separate and each was responsible for specific areas of expenditure.
When a property is bought jointly, there is a presumption that it will be owned equally. However, that presumption can be overturned if there is evidence that equality was not the common intention of the owners. Mr Stack claimed he was entitled to a half share in the value of the house. Ms Dowden disagreed.
Lord Hope of Craighead, in his judgment, said, “I do not think that it is possible to ignore the fact that the contributions which they made to the purchase of that property were not equal. The relative extent of those contributions provides the best guide as to where their beneficial interests lay, in the absence of compelling evidence that by the end of their relationship they did indeed intend to share the beneficial interests equally.”
In this case, the fact that the couple’s resources were never ‘pooled’, together with the greater contribution made by Ms Dowden, led the Lords to conclude that her share should be 65 per cent of the total.
Says Alison Whistler, “Cohabiting couples are well advised to have their intentions as regards beneficial ownership of properties they buy properly recorded and evidenced.”
Compensation Ordered for Duped ‘Dad’
A woman who misrepresented the paternity of her child to her ex-partner, and thereby obtained financial support from him as he believed himself to be the father, was recently ordered to pay him compensation.
The woman gave birth to the child whilst in a relationship with the man. She had assured him that he was the father and he had supported both mother and child. When their relationship later foundered, she disputed that he was the father and a DNA test confirmed that he was not. Subsequent to the results of the DNA test, the man stopped making any payments to her.
The man sued his ex-partner. In the view of the court, the woman had made fraudulent misrepresentations with the intent that the man should rely on them. Since he had suffered a loss because of the misrepresentations, he was entitled to damages. The court also held that he was entitled to special damages on account of money spent on the mother, but not for money spent for the child’s sole benefit.
Says Karen Eves, “Under the provisions of the new Fraud Act, making a fraudulent statement with the intention of benefiting from it constitutes an offence, carrying a maximum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.”
Consumer Law Gives Protection in Standard Form Contracts
In many commercial situations, businesses are used to dealing with each other by the use of ‘standard form’ contracts. One of the common instances of the use of such contracts is in the building industry, where construction projects are often governed by standard JCT contracts.
In a recent case, a builder who entered into a standard JCT ‘minor works’ contract with a residential occupier sought to enforce the decision of the adjudicator that he should receive interim payments which had been withheld by the customer. The payments were withheld because of disputes about delays in the work and the quality of some of the workmanship. The withholding of the interim payments was not accompanied by the issuing of withholding notices, which are required under the JCT agreement. The adjudicator therefore ruled that the interim payments were due to be made, because the customer had not complied with the terms of the contract as regards the withholding of payments.
This decision was challenged, using EU consumer law, on the grounds that the contract entered into took away normal standard consumer rights and thereby created an imbalance of rights between the builder and his customer. To rely on the provisions of the contract, it would be necessary for the builder to have specifically drawn the attention of the customer to the relevant terms of the contract. Because this was not done, the court ruled that the stage payments were not payable.
Says John Lennon, “Any business that relies on standard contracts and whose customers are private individuals must make sure that where the contract contains clauses limiting the usual consumer rights, these are brought to the customer’s attention and agreement to them is specifically evidenced. Failure to do so could result in the relevant clauses being considered to be void by the court.”
Government Proposes Changes to Law on Damages
The Department for Constitutional Affairs has issued a consultation document on the civil law relating to claims for damages. The paper considers making it possible for a wider range of people to bring claims for damages where someone has been killed as a result of the negligence of another. It is proposed to extend the categories of persons considered to be dependants and of those eligible to claim damages for bereavement.
The main proposals are:
- to extend the statutory list of those able to make a claim as a dependant so that it includes ‘any person who was being wholly or partly maintained by the deceased immediately before the death’;
- to include any person who had been living with the deceased as husband and wife (or in an equivalent same sex relationship) for at least two years immediately prior to the accident;
- to extend the list of claimants able to claim bereavement damages to include children of the deceased who were under 18 at the time of the death; and
- to provide for a fixed sum of £5,000 in bereavement damages for each eligible child of the deceased under the age of 18.
Another idea under consideration is the possibility that in the case of injury, the injured person could claim the cost of private medical treatment where appropriate.
The consultation paper can be seen at - http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/damages/cp0907.htm.
Holiday Club Warning
As the summer holiday season comes around again, the thought of a permanent arrangement for discounted holidays in the sun could seem attractive, but take care! The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has warned that there are many bogus ‘holiday clubs’ being marketed.
Holiday clubs are marketed as a more flexible and often lower cost alternative to timeshare ownership, offering worldwide holidays at attractive prices for life. However, warns the OFT, many of these offer little or no real benefit.
The OFT’s advice for avoiding being scammed is to beware any ‘cold call’ over the telephone or being approached whilst on holiday. Typically, a holiday resort tout will offer a free scratch card (all of which will be ‘winners’). To collect the prize, a presentation must be attended at which high-pressure sales tactics may well be used, or you may be lured by the ‘exclusivity’ of the offer.
Techniques used by bogus holiday clubs include:
- presentations that last so long that you are tempted to sign up just because you are desperate to leave;
- making sure you are not left alone to discuss anything with your partner and giving you a very limited time to view the contract; and
- telling you that they have made you a special discounted offer which is only valid for that day, placing you under pressure to sign on the spot.
In practice, many of the holidays that can be obtained after paying thousands of pounds for membership are the same as those which could be booked elsewhere without the need to belong to a holiday club.
Says John Lennon, “Many people who buy a holiday club membership or a timeshare whilst on holiday live to regret it. Given the cost involved, it makes sense to take time to think it over, check out the vendor and take advice on your legal rights.”
Husband Loses Big Money Decision
The Court of Appeal has ruled against insurance magnate John Charman and confirmed that the UK’s largest-ever divorce settlement should stand.
In September 2006, the Family Division of the High Court ordered that Mr Charman’s former wife Beverly should receive a lump sum of £40m and retain existing assets of £8m already in her own name. To accomplish this, it ordered that a trust set up by the couple should be divided, not retained for the benefit of their children.
The family wealth was estimated to exceed £130m and the couple had been married for 28 years before their divorce. Virtually all of their wealth had been created during that time. Mr Charman had offered his wife a settlement of £20m, unforgettably stating that it was ‘more than anyone could spend in a lifetime’.
The decision confirms that there is a presumption by the courts that ‘assets of the marriage’ (i.e. those that are created during the marriage as opposed to being brought to it by one of the spouses or created after the couple separates) belong to the ex-spouses in equal shares.
The judges were critical of the current law in this area and called for pre-nuptial agreements to be made binding in law. “How much difference this would have made in a case such as this is moot,” says Alison Whistler, “as prior to their marriage, the Charmans were of modest means.”
This decision and similar ones prior to it are not necessarily the ‘bonanza for wives’ that they are being portrayed as in the media. For example, in a recent case in which a wife claimed a share of her husband’s expected future earnings, the claim was rejected as she had not contributed to his success at work. The UK does, however, remain a very attractive place for divorce proceedings to be brought where there is a successful spouse and significant family wealth.
Oral Agreement Gives Rise to Property Rights
It is a well-established principle of English law that contracts involving land must be made in writing. However, that is not to say that just because an agreement relating to land is not made in writing, it is unenforceable.
One circumstance in which rights over property can be created orally is when a constructive trust arises due to an oral agreement being made with regard to a property. A constructive trust is where a person has responsibility over another person’s property as a result of the operation of law. A recent case illustrates such a circumstance. It involved two men, Mr Oates and Mr Stimson, who bought a house jointly in 1995, each paying an equal share of the mortgage. Mr Oates had financial problems and moved out in 1997. He agreed to sell his interest in the property to Mr Stimson for £2,500 and that Mr Stimson would pay him when he was able. Mr Stimson then took over sole responsibility for making the mortgage payments and for the maintenance of the property.
In 2000, Mr Stimson attempted to pay the £2,500 to Mr Oates. Mr Oates denied that the agreement existed and claimed £50,000 as his share of the value of the house.
The judge accepted Mr Stimson’s evidence that the agreement existed and that by taking over the responsibility for the mortgage payments and repairs he had suffered a detriment. He therefore found that this gave rise to a constructive trust in Mr Stimson’s favour. Once he had paid the £2,500 to Mr Oates, therefore, the full value of the property belonged to him.
Says John Lennon, “This is another example of a dispute ending in litigation which could easily have been avoided had the agreement been properly documented in the first place. Relying on someone else to confirm an agreement for which there is no written evidence is risky at best. If you find yourself in similar circumstances, take legal advice.”
Proposals to Protect Cohabitees
The number of people who are living together in a relationship but who are neither married nor civil partners continues to rise. Many of these people are probably completely unaware that they have few rights in the event of a break-up of their relationship and that such rights as they do have centre around any children of the relationship. It is estimated that within fifteen years, nearly a third of all households will be made up of cohabitees as opposed to married couples or civil partners.
The problems that the current legal position has left unresolved have led the Law Commission to issue a consultation document called ‘Cohabitation: the Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown’, which runs to nearly 400 pages.
According to the Law Commission, a scheme is necessary to set out the respective rights of cohabitees. In the Commission’s view, these rights should be automatic, but couples should be able to ‘opt out’ if they so wish. Accordingly, the scheme would apply to all cohabiting couples unless they specifically elect for it not to. It would necessitate the creation of a ‘cohabitation contract’, which would be required to be in writing, signed and witnessed. It is possible that cohabitation contracts would be required to be made with the benefit of legal advice.
The Law Commission’s proposal is that the scheme should be available to all cohabitants who have children and to those who have cohabited for two years or more, whether or not they have children.
The proposals are that the financial arrangements on the termination of the cohabitation should resemble those currently applied in divorce cases. It is also proposed that the ability to make a claim for financial provision against the estate of a deceased cohabitee should be based on the reasonable expectation of the likely settlement in the event of separation. This would only apply were one of the partners to die without making a will or with a will which made inadequate provision for the surviving partner.
At the moment, there seem to be a number of loose ends in the Law Commission’s proposals, especially concerning the criteria applied in assessing the financial settlements when couples split up.
It is likely that the proposals will be debated for some time yet, so the legislation which will bring them into effect is not likely to appear before 2008 at the earliest. It is also likely to undergo many changes before it reaches the statute book.
“Until the proposals have passed into law, the position of cohabitees is best protected by having a formal written agreement, which should be made with the benefit of independent legal advice on both sides,” saysKaren Eves.
If you are in a cohabiting relationship and are concerned about what happens if your partner dies or the relationship ends, contact us for advice.
Valuing Annuity Payments for IHT
When a person dies, there is often no right to receive any further payment under an annuity. However, many annuities are sold which have ‘guaranteed minimum payment periods’ – typically five years after the annuity first vests. In such cases, if a person dies before the end of the minimum payment period, further annuity payments will be receivable.
Valuing the right to receive such payments for Inheritance Tax (IHT) purposes can be problematic, but HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) have an online calculator which provides an estimate of the open market value of the guaranteed annuity payments in straightforward circumstances. This consists of a form requesting the information necessary for the calculation to be made. In the view of HMRC, the estimate given by the electronic calculator constitutes a reasonable estimate of the open market value of the annuity for IHT purposes.
The form can be found at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/cto/forms/g_annuity.pdf.
Care Assessment Must Consider Child’s Interests
When a local authority carries out a care assessment to determine the needs of a child, the principal object, which must remain in focus at all times, is the child and his or her needs.
Recently, the court heard a case which involved an autistic child with learning difficulties and health problems. The child’s mother was struggling to cope with looking after him at home and a care assessment was ordered to be carried out.
The assessment found that the mother was having such difficulty coping with the boy that her mental and physical health were being impaired. It concluded that the child should be moved to a boarding school which, having previously assessed him, would be able to cope with him.
The local authority’s education and social services panel met some months later and a second assessment was prepared by a social worker. This concluded that the initial assessment had been unduly influenced by the mother’s claim that she was unable to cope and recommended that an additional support package (largely undefined) be given to enable the child to remain at home.
The mother applied for a judicial review of the decision on her son’s behalf, contesting it on several grounds, but most particularly because the local authority had failed to consider the educational, health and social care interests of the child.
The court agreed that the initial care assessment could be considered to place undue emphasis on the needs of the mother rather than the child, but was of the view that the second assessment’s conclusion, that the ‘package of support’ was preferable for the child to a residential placement, was seriously flawed, especially as the package of support to be provided was ‘woolly’ and largely undefined.
At issue here was not only the extent to which the local authority had properly considered the needs of the child – which is their primary duty in such cases – but also the extent to which it had made a defensible case that its care plan met the child’s needs.
Says Karen Eves, “Local authorities will often suggest plans which avoid residential placements in order to save costs. Where a residential placement is in the child’s best interests, the decision can be fought. A lack of a clear and coherent support strategy should also be called into question as, in practice, vague promises of ‘support packages’ can often fail to amount to much.”
If you are not getting the support you require from your local authority, contact us for advice.
Cases Show Court Hostility to Poor Behaviour
Three recent cases illustrate the point that even in disputes involving land, the behaviour of a landowner can be an important factor when it comes to the final decision of the court.
In the first case, the claimants (the Owers) went to court to obtain a ruling that their property had a right of way over a track of unknown ownership, which adjoined their property and was the only means of access to it. The track and another adjacent property had originally been part of the same property. When the Owers bought their property, the track was fenced off from the adjoining property. When that property was sold to a Mr Bailey, they allowed the fence to be removed so that he could move in. Subsequently, Mr Bailey claimed title to the land. He blocked the track repeatedly with his tractor and erected gates at the end of it, which he insisted remained shut. This state of affairs persisted for a period of four months before the court could rule on the matter and confirm the existence of the Owers’ right of way. Because Mr Bailey had acted in a spiteful and malicious way, aggravated damages were awarded to the Owers in the sum of £4,500. Damages for loss of amenity were assessed in the sum of £2,000.
In a second case, a company was unsuccessful in obtaining an injunction to prevent interference with its right to light because it had boarded up windows which would have suffered the loss of light throughout the ‘prescription period’. The court awarded a small amount of monetary compensation instead.
In the third case, a landlord who sued a tenant for non-payment of service charges was faced with a counterclaim from the tenant. The tenant successfully claimed that the landlord had failed to make all reasonable endeavours to repair the roof of the building. The court agreed with the tenant and ruled that he should not bear any liability for the roof repairs.
What these cases all show, in different ways, is that in normal litigation cases the courts will look at the behaviour of the parties in a dispute before making its decision. Litigants who wish to have a successful outcome would do well to ensure that their own behaviour cannot be criticised.
Check Your Will
A recent case has shown the wisdom of checking your will to make sure that it accurately reflects your wishes. Not only can these change over time, but it is possible that your wishes were misunderstood at the drafting stage, as happened in this case. If someone dies and this has happened, it may be possible to go to court to have the will rectified, but this will inevitably involve unnecessary expense and delay.
The circumstances were that a man named Guy Goodman and his wife, Jennifer, wished to buy the property owned by Mr Goodman’s father, Geoffrey. A deal was done whereby Jennifer agreed to buy the property by paying Geoffrey £3,000 per month for 20 years. He agreed to pay her a rent of £1,000 per month, producing a net payment from Jennifer of £2,000 per month.
When Guy and Jennifer had their wills drafted in March 2003, these made provision for a monthly allowance of £2,000 be paid to Geoffrey in the event that they predeceased him. In March 2004, Guy died. Geoffrey and Jennifer disagreed over what his will was intended to accomplish, with the result that Jennifer had to go to court to have it rectified because she argued that it had not been intended to benefit Geoffrey in this way.
In the view of the court, what had occurred (and the solicitor’s testimony confirmed this) was that Guy and Jennifer’s instructions had been misunderstood. The result was a pair of wills (Jennifer’s had the same clause) which gave a legacy when the intention was merely to acknowledge the existing agreement for the purchase of Geoffrey’s property and the rental agreement. The court considered the fact that Jennifer’s will was couched in the same terms as Guy’s and that the legacy was to last only while Geoffrey occupied the property as strong evidence that this was the case, as was the fact that the allowance was equal to the net payment under the agreement.
This case is one which could have been avoided had the wording of the draft wills been carefully considered before they were signed and witnessed. Indeed, had the will been looked at carefully, and the erroneous clause spotted, the writing of a new will or making of an amendment to the existing will would have been straightforward.
If your will was written some years ago, or your family circumstances have altered, it might need to be changed. If you find anything in your will that you do not understand or which does not reflect your wishes, contact Chris Lawn for advice.
Child Contact – Changes Afoot
The new Children and Adoption Act 2006, which received Royal Assent last summer, makes changes to the way in which contact between divorced parents and their children will be governed.
Under the Act, when deciding on contact arrangements, the court is empowered to make a ‘direction’ requiring the person named to take part in an activity that promotes contact with the child concerned. Such activities could include, for example, counselling or anger management training. A contact activity direction cannot include requiring medical or psychiatric assessment or treatment however.
Contact activity directions cover the interim stage between the commencement of proceedings and the court’s disposal of them. A contact activity direction is made only on a parent of the child and can be made when the contact arrangements are disputed and the habitual residence is in England or Wales.
When such a direction is made, the person who wishes to have contact with the child must comply with it. It must specify both the activity and the person who will provide it. This means that the court must consider not only the suitability of the provider of the activity but also the information about the person being ordered to undertake the activity, to ensure the activity is suitable. Such a direction can be applied for by one of a number of people who have contact with the child, as well as by the child itself.
If the terms of the contact activity direction are breached, the court can make an ‘enforcement order’, which involves the imposition of an unpaid work order (‘community service’). This must be preceded by a warning notice and the court must be satisfied that the enforcement order is necessary to obtain compliance with the contact activity direction. The court must also be satisfied that the effect of the enforcement order is not out of proportion to the seriousness of the breach.
Where the breach of a contact activity direction has a financial implication, the court can order compensation to be paid if financial loss is suffered.
The aim of the changes, which are somewhat more complex and far-reaching than outlined above, is to protect the welfare of children when a couple divorce. It remains to be seen how effective this raft of new legislation will be, as there is no extra resource provision being made available to monitor compliance with contact activity directions.
Our family law department can help you with any aspect of family law.
Noisy Pubs – What Can be Done?
With many licensed premises opening until late at night, problems of rowdy behaviour by night time revellers can be considerable for people who live in the surrounding area.
If a local pub or club becomes a nuisance to those living nearby, what steps can be taken?
Clearly, one option is to complain to the local authority and to keep complaining if things do not improve. Most licensing committees will put the licence holder under considerable pressure to bring about improvements if complaints continue to be made. Making recordings of the noise or other anti-social behaviour being complained of can strengthen one’s case.
However, before going down the ‘official route’, here are some things you can ask the licensee to do which might help you reach a solution which will preserve goodwill all round. You can request that they:
- put up signs in the car park and near the exits reminding customers that it is a residential area and requesting that noise be kept to a minimum;
- give out sweets or lollipops to customers leaving late at night – the idea being that they are too busy chewing to make noise. This novel approach has proved effective in many instances;
- control the volume of any music they play;
- leave doors shut where possible, so that sound is controlled;
- ask taxi drivers to turn off their engines while they wait and to refrain from sounding their horns on arrival;
- instruct staff and security people to intervene when customers are rowdy; and
- advise households in the neighbourhood in advance when a late licence or function likely to cause extra noise is scheduled.
If all else fails, pressure can be exerted on local environmental health officers. They have the power to bring prosecutions against pubs which create excessive noise between 11pm and 7am, which can lead to fines of up to £5,000. If necessary, a noise abatement notice can be issued. Failure to prevent noise nuisance after the issue of a noise abatement notice can lead to a fine of up to £20,000 and/or six months’ imprisonment for the licensee.
Contact John Lennon for more information.
Option Agreement Binding on Landlord Despite Rent Arrears
A landlord whose lease contains an 'option to buy' clause cannot avoid selling the property if the tenant exercises the option, even if the tenant is behind with the rent.
A recent case saw a landlord, who refused to sell the freehold of a property to a tenant on these grounds, ordered by the court to complete the sale.
The tenant had a five-year lease over the property which contained an option to buy clause. The tenant wrote to the landlord stating that he wished to exercise the option to purchase the property. The landlord refused to accept the notice and issued proceedings for possession of the property because of the arrears of rent. The tenant went to court for an order of specific performance over the property purchase. A specific performance order is used in cases involving breach of contract, where one party to the contract refuses to perform its obligations under it. The order requires them to perform their contractual obligations as set out in the contract. In this case, the performance required under the contract was the sale of the property to the tenant under the option agreement.
The landlord argued that the tenant’s notice was not validly served and that a clause in the option agreement, which stipulated that the purchase must be completed within two years, was not complied with.
The court rejected these arguments ruling that the option notice was validly served by the tenant and that the clause which said the purchase had to be executed within two years was only part of the legal mechanics of the agreement. Furthermore, the arrears of rent were not relevant.
Accordingly, the landlord was ordered to sell the property to the tenant under the option agreement. On appeal, the Court of Appeal confirmed the judgment.
Poorer Spouse Must Have Proper Representation
Most of the divorce cases featured recently in the press have been ones where the settlement involved the division of substantial assets between independently wealthy spouses.
In some cases, however, there is a disparity of assets between the divorcing couple and one of the spouses has insufficient funds to obtain proper advice. In such cases a ‘costs allowance’ may be made against the other spouse, requiring them to provide funds so that the other party can be legally represented.
A recent case dealt with such a situation. In this case, the ex-wife was considerably better off than her ex-husband and she had been ordered to make periodical payments to him. She wished to change this and to negotiate a ‘clean break’ agreement, by the making of a single ‘one-off’ payment. The court decided that the ex-husband did not have sufficient assets to obtain proper legal advice, so the judge ordered his ex-wife to pay an additional £10,000 per month for four months to provide him with sufficient money to finance his legal representation until the end of the financial dispute resolution process.
She appealed. She alleged that her ex-husband owed her £36,000 in respect of costs and that he had impoverished himself through unwise litigation. She also alleged that he had not made a full disclosure of his financial affairs.
The chief issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the ex-husband had demonstrated that he could not reasonably obtain appropriate advice and representation without the costs allowance being granted. For example, if he had assets, he would need to demonstrate that they were not realisable or could not be used as security for a loan. Also, the court had to be sure that he was not eligible for public funding of his legal costs.
Although the question of the debt owed to the ex-wife carried weight, the Court of Appeal was of the view that facts had been properly considered by the judge in the lower court and it would not seek to overturn that ruling.
This case illustrates the point that the courts are primarily concerned with making sure that where there is a significant disparity of assets in such cases, the ‘weaker’ spouse does not suffer as a result of being unable to secure proper legal representation. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal is unlikely to change the decision of a lower court provided it has taken proper regard of the facts made available to it.
The Court of Appeal judged that the restriction of the costs allowance to the end of the financial dispute resolution process was a deterrent to spinning out the dispute and did not amount to an improper inducement to settle prematurely.
Says Karen Eves, “In divorce proceedings, having less wealth than your spouse should not prevent you from getting proper legal support.”
Right to Buy – The Present Position
The right of secure tenants to buy their homes was established under the Housing Act 1980. The original rules have subsequently been amended, however, mainly owing to a growing number of abuses of the system. These mainly involved property speculators who made agreements with secure tenants to the effect that they would acquire their properties under the right to buy provisions, using finance provided by the property speculator who would then purchase the property and rebate to the tenant some of the discount they had received.
The discounts applicable when a tenant exercises the right to buy range from 35 per cent to 60 per cent in the case of flats and from 50 per cent to 70 per cent in the case of houses, although there is sometimes a cap on the maximum discount that can be given.
More recently, the right to buy of tenants subject to an anti-social behaviour order has been limited through the establishment of a ‘demoted tenancy’.
Secure tenants will acquire the right to buy their property after five years but the right to buy with a discount is not without limitations. Firstly, the tenant must covenant not to sell the property within five years, subject to loss of the discount. The amount of discount to be repaid is calculated with reference to the value of the property at the date of resale, so that rising property prices will not produce a windfall profit for the purchasing tenant if they sell in the first five years.
Also, in a bid to prevent property speculators from cashing in on the discounts, a deferred agreement to resell the property to someone else, entered into before the right to buy is exercised or during the five-year period after purchase, will trigger a repayment of the discount.
Furthermore, the right of first refusal to purchase the property remains with a social landlord for ten years after the purchase.
There are a variety of other measures which aim to prevent other abuses of the right to buy legislation.
If you are a secure tenant and are considering the purchase of your home, contact Nessie Orosco–Yousaf for advice.
Trustee Exemption Clauses – New Approach
The Law Commission has recommended the adoption of a new approach to clauses in trust deeds which limit the liability of paid trustees.
The recommendation requires paid trustees and the persons drafting the relevant trust deed to ensure that the settlor of any trust assets is made aware of any clause in the trust document which excludes or restricts the liability of a trustee for any loss to the trust as a result of breach of trust. This must be done before the trust document is created but will not apply where the settlor has the benefit of independent legal advice or where the trustee is acting in the normal course of business, for example when the trustee is a pension trustee.
The relevant professional bodies (the Law Society, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, etc.) will implement the ruling by making a change to the rule books of their members. The Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners has already done so.
The rule only applies to paid trustees. However, a trustee who receives an indirect benefit as a result of his position could well be considered to be a paid trustee. This might make some unpaid trustees subject to the new regime, possibly without their being aware of it.
Says Michael Cutler, “If you are asked to be a trustee of a trust of any kind, including a charity, you should take legal advice. Trustee positions are not without risk and you should make sure that both an appropriate trust deed and trustee insurance are in place.”
Violent Fathers – Is the Court of Appeal Too Soft?
Two recent cases show that the Court of Appeal seems unwilling to ‘throw the book’ at violent fathers.
A father with a history of violence, who seriously and persistently breached orders not to molest his former wife, has successfully appealed against four consecutive sentences, of three months' imprisonment each, for contempt of court.
He had damaged property belonging to his ex-wife’s family, sent her threatening letters and threatened to kill her, even after being served with a non-molestation order. Although these were serious matters, the Court of Appeal considered that for him to be given (in effect) a twelve month custodial sentence, when the maximum sentence which could be given was two years’ imprisonment, was too onerous. It ordered that the sentence be reduced to one of eight months' imprisonment.
In another case, the Court of Appeal reinstated an indirect contact order, between a violent father and his child, which had been terminated because of the father’s violence towards his ex-wife. The child’s guardian was convinced that the continuation of the indirect contact would allow the father to trace the whereabouts of his former wife, which was highly undesirable given his propensity to violence towards her. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the arrangements which were in place were suitable to ensure that this did not happen, so reinstated his right to indirect contact.
Says Karen Eves, “The protection given by the courts to people who suffer violence at the hands of family members and ex-spouses is improving, but it could be bettered. Strong legal representation can help to ensure that such problems are dealt with as quickly and enforced as strongly as possible.”
Budget Inheritance Tax Grab - April 2006
What was, for many Maidonians, the biggest news of the latest Budget was not mentioned at all by Gordon Brown in his speech, but was buried in the ‘small print’ on pages 65 to 68 of the Budget Notes. This was how the nation found out about the Chancellor’s “alignment” of Inheritance Tax (IHT) on trusts – in fact, the biggest shake-up of IHT in 20 years.
According to Michael Cutler, a partner with Colemans Solicitors of Maidenhead,
and a member of the prestigious Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners
(STEP),
“The government’s line is that this will affect only
20,000 of the richest people in the country, but that is nonsense. STEP
conducted a snap poll just after the Budget – only 11% of the STEP
members were able to respond at such short notice, but they alone
identified 831,000 of their clients who would be affected! “
The use of discretionary trusts for estate planning or to receive life policy, death in service, or pension money, is not affected at all, but the rules for taxing most other trusts are changing and a wide range of people may be touched by the new rules:-
- If you left money in your Will to children or grandchildren at the age of 25, or any other age over 18 (so they might be expected to be more mature and better-able to manage it), that can mean an extra tax of at least 6% on that money.
- If you left money in your Will in a life-interest trust for a vulnerable adult or child (so someone else can control the capital) that can now attract additional IHT charges.
- If you left money in your Will in a life-interest trust for your spouse (very common in a second marriage, leaving it to the new spouse for life, and then to your children by the first marriage) that can mean you lose the spouse exemption altogether, paying IHT at 40% on everything over the nil-rate band, and then a further 6% charge every ten years, and again when your spouse dies.
- If you put money into a life interest trust or an accumulation and maintenance trust (perhaps to give it to children or grandchildren who are too young to own it), that money can now be subject to the same pattern of 6% IHT charges.
- If you took out life insurance and wrote the benefits in trust using the life company’s standard documents (to ensure that the beneficiary will get the money promptly on your death), the policy money can now attract IHT.
Michael Cutler cautions:
“Don’t panic – yet! An unprecedented
coalition of lawyers, accountants, insurers and trust professionals
is now lobbying the Treasury for changes to be made before these
proposals become law in the summer, so we are not yet quite sure
how this will turn out. However, if you think you could be affected,
ask your solicitor for advice. Although few people will need to rush
to change things before we know the final shape of the new law in
the summer, it will be prudent to keep an eye on developments. I
will be posting information as it becomes available, on our website
at www.colemans.co.uk. Finally, if you have not yet done anything
at all to minimise the effect of Inheritance Tax on your estate,
the main techniques are untouched by the Budget and there is no need
to wait until the summer – you can and should act now!”
Trust and estate specialist Michael Cutler can be contacted at Colemans Solicitors, 21 Marlow Road, Maidenhead SL6 7AA, by telephone on 01628 631051 or by email.
Short-marriage Widow Sees Financial Provision Cut
A judge who failed to explain how he had reached his decision as to the amount that should be awarded to a widow from her late husband’s estate, in order to allow her to meet her future financial needs, recently found his decision overturned by the Court of Appeal. The widow in question had made a claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, which allows dependants to apply for reasonable financial provision from the estate of the person on whom they were dependent if appropriate provision is not made in the will.
In this case, the estate was valued at £1.4m and belonged to a man who died 13 months after marrying his cleaner, whom he had only known for six months prior to the marriage.
In the lower court the judge ruled that the widow should receive £800,000 by way of a lump sum, but failed to explain the reasoning behind his decision. The executors appealed on behalf of the beneficiaries, claiming that the award did not reflect a proper balance of interests between the widow and the family. The Court of Appeal found that the judge’s reasoning was flawed in several respects and considered that, given the brevity of the marriage, the original apportionment might not be appropriate.
It was decided that the widow should receive £600,000 which, after tax and legal costs, amounted to approximately 60 per cent of the value of the net estate.
“This case is one of a series of judgments (mainly in the divorce courts) involving short marriages and high value estates,” says Alison Whistler “In circumstances such as these, case law is very persuasive and although settlements must be decided on the relevant facts, the quality of legal representation is of critical importance.”
Prescott Aims to End ‘Satellite Dish Blight’
Satellite dishes may be very popular, but few if any would argue that they are beautiful. In a bid to square the circle between the negative visual impact of satellite dishes and other antennae and the need for people to have access to digital services, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister has issued planning guidelines on the siting of aerials and satellite dishes. These are intended to comply with the ‘neutrality of technology’ required by the Communications Act 2003. The regulations will apply to all forms of receiving apparatus.
The present guidelines require that an antenna is sited in such a way as to minimise the impact on the external appearance of the building. This requirement will remain. The additional requirements for dwellings and buildings under 15m in height are:
- up to two antennae are permitted, the larger of which shall not exceed 100cm in any direction and 35 litres in cubic capacity;
- the maximum size for the second (smaller) antenna is 60cm in any linear direction and 35 litres cubic capacity;
- antennae mounted on chimneys are restricted to the smaller of the above sizes. If there is a chimney, the antenna must not rise above it and must not in any event rise more than 60cm above the roof line; and
- if the property has no chimney, the antenna should not rise above the roof line.
The regulations are different for buildings in conservation areas and National Parks, buildings taller than 15 metres, and those located in areas of outstanding natural beauty. Listed buildings continue to require planning consent for the siting of an aerial.
If you require advice on any planning matter contact Mike Stone.
Lasting Powers of Attorney – Government Reveals Plans
The Government has now outlined its plans for lasting powers of attorney (LPAs). The difference between these new arrangements and the existing enduring power of attorney (EPA) is that an EPA only allows the attorney to deal with the financial affairs of the person granting the power, whereas under the new arrangements the attorney can be allowed to make decisions concerning their health and welfare, if they are no longer able to do so themselves. LPAs will also allow a person to make an ‘advance direction’, commonly referred to as a ‘living will’, specifying in what circumstances they do not wish life-sustaining medical treatment to be given.
Powers of attorney are normally brought into use when a person lacks the ability to make decisions for him or herself. Under the plans, there will be a strict code of conduct for attorneys and any advance directions will have to be made in writing. The guidance sets out the procedures for making and changing an LPA and what needs to be done, in particular, where a living will is incorporated into the arrangements. It also stresses that such arrangements should be kept under regular review.
A period of consultation will now take place with a view to bringing in legislation effective from April 2007.
Says Chris Lawn, “The LPA should make it much easier for families who have to deal with the affairs of persons who are not competent to make their own decisions, especially those suffering from illnesses such as Alzheimer’s disease and senile dementia. People should give consideration to these issues and make sure that if they create an LPA, it is done at a time when their mental competence is not in doubt.”
Landlords to Lose Right to Retain Deposits
The Government has announced that it is to set up a company to control the deposits paid to landlords by their tenants. The aim is to put an end to the problem caused by unscrupulous landlords who do not return deposits at the end of a tenancy. One in five tenants is said to be aggrieved at how their deposit has been dealt with at the end of their tenancy.
However, critics of the new Tenancy Deposit Scheme (TDS) point out that it does not contain any protection for landlords who find that a tenant has withheld the last month’s rent, which is also said to occur in approximately 20 per cent of cases.
Under the TDS, the deposit will be paid into escrow with the company and an arbitration system set up to resolve disputes between landlords and tenants over the amount of damage done to a property which is attributable to the tenant. Landlords will fund the scheme by payment of a fee and will have no right to the interest earned on the deposit during the period of the tenancy. Landlords who fail to put the deposit into the scheme within 14 days of receipt will be hit with a fine of up to three times the deposit. The Government is also drawing up guidelines as to what constitutes reasonable wear and tear, which is the responsibility of the landlord and not the tenant. The new system is intended to apply to properties rented after 1 October 2006.
For landlords, the TDS will mean extra costs and bureaucracy. For tenants, it will mean assurance that at the end of the tenancy, their deposit will not simply be pocketed by the landlord. Over £740m of deposits are reported to be held by landlords in respect of shorthold tenancies.
Says Andrew Wong, “Landlords will not welcome the additional complexity this will bring, although assurances have been given that the extra cost of the scheme will be low. It is hoped that the new arrangements will give tenants confidence that in normal circumstances deposits will be refunded so there will no longer be an incentive to withhold rent rather than struggle to recover the deposit held by the landlord.”
Chancellor Declares War on Trusts
The Chancellor has declared war on the use of tax advantaged accumulation and maintenance (A&M) trusts by making them subject to an immediate ‘entry’ tax charge of 20 per cent on lifetime transfers that exceed the Inheritance Tax threshold. By deeming them to be ‘relevant property’ trusts, the 6 per cent ‘periodic’ charge and the ‘exit’ charge when trust assets vest will also apply, except where specific conditions are met. The main exceptions will be trusts arising on death where the beneficiary receives the assets at age eighteen or trusts which are created for the benefit of a disabled person.
Existing A&M trusts which provide that the assets in trust will go to a beneficiary absolutely at 18 – or where the terms on which they are held are modified before 6 April 2008 to provide this – will continue to have the current exemptions. Where they do not, the trust assets will become ‘relevant property’ from 6 April 2008 and the periodic and exit charges will apply.
Contact Michael Cutler for advice on this or any other wealth-protection or trust matter.
How Divorce Works
The basic requirements for obtaining a divorce in England and Wales are that a couple must have been married for a year, the marriage must be legally recognised under UK law and it must have broken down irretrievably. Irretrievable breakdown must be demonstrated to the court by one of five reasons or 'grounds':
- adultery;
- unreasonable behaviour;
- desertion;
- two years' separation with consent; or
- five years' separation without consent.
In practice, if both parties want to be divorced quickly, then the most common ground on which to proceed is unreasonable behaviour. This is used when there has been no adultery and the parties wish to avoid the delay caused by the last three grounds. Unreasonable behaviour can be evidenced by, for example, violence or mental cruelty as well as more subtle complaints such as the exercise of unreasonable control. To support the claim of unreasonable behaviour, one party must agree to give a brief description of the behaviour in the divorce petition.
It is useful to understand the outline of the process and some of the legal terminology. The party to the marriage who makes the application, or petition, for divorce is known as the petitioner while the other party is called the respondent. The petition for divorce is delivered to, or served on, the respondent. The respondent then has 29 days in which either to admit that the petition is true or to defend the divorce – although defended divorces are very unusual. The respondent agrees by returning an affidavit, a signed statement of the truth, to the court.
Normally, a district judge will then decide on the date of a decree nisi, which is the first step towards the formal divorce. Six weeks after the date set for the decree nisi, the petitioner can apply for the decree absolute. When this is granted, the divorce is final. If the petitioner does not apply for the decree absolute, the respondent may do so three months after that date.
It is beneficial if arrangements concerning any children from the marriage and the split of family assets are agreed without having to go to court. However, it is important to have good legal advice even if these decisions are made amicably. The court will always suggest mediation first in order to reach a mutually acceptable agreement between the parties.
In all, the divorce process is likely to take between five and eight months to complete. It will, however, take longer if there are disagreements over children or money which cannot be settled without the intervention of the court.
Contact Karen Eves for advice on any family law matter.
